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Early Repayment of Loans Under EU Law: The Lexitor
Judgment
Enrico Baffi and Francesco Parisi

Abstract
Recent changes in EU law provide flexibility and protection to consumers, facilitating
early repayment of loans, when the consumer is no longer interested in continuing a
credit relationship. From an economic point of view, early repayment of loans should be
facilitated, because it allows money that is no longer needed to be put to other desirable
uses. Under current EU law, as recently interpreted in the Lexitor judgment by the
Court of Justice of the European Union, upon early repayment of a loan, consumers can
obtain a pro-rated reimbursement of all the up-front and recurring costs of the loan,
including origination fees and ancillary service costs. In this brief article, we take a
critical look at the current EU approach to this issue, suggesting that, while the legislature
made the pragmatic choice in permitting partial reimbursement of up-front costs, this
leads to several economic inefficiencies that can ultimately hurt the consumer. Repayment
of up-front costs, and of any other sunk cost associated with the creation of the loan, can
lead to a suboptimal mix of lending contracts. Some consumers could, in fact, take out a
lower interest rate long-term credit, even though they may only need a short-term loan,
and this would create a disadvantage for the overall class of consumers. In order to
actually protect the economic interest of consumers and carry out the intent of the
legislature, we conclude that the up-front costs for non-mandatory ancillary services
(such as brokerage fees, etc.) should not be included in the costs that are eligible for
reimbursement in the event of early repayment of the loan. By excluding these costs,
consumers will not be incentivized to overconsume such services, minimizing the
negative externalities imposed on other consumers.

I.

Introduction

Under current EU law, consumers have the right to fully or partially repay
loans early and are entitled to obtain a pro-rated reimbursement of all the fixed
and recurring costs of the loan. As currently applied, this pro-rated reimbursement
includes origination fees, brokerage and legal fees, and all other fixed costs that are
associated with the creation of the loan (hereinafter, we shall refer to this category
of costs as ‘up-front costs’). But the question remains whether allowing for the
reimbursement of up-front costs in the event of early loan repayment is
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economically efficient or even intended by the European legislature.
The rules governing early repayment of loans have emerged gradually in
the EU over the last several years. The European legislature recently issued
Directive 2008/48/EC in an effort create ‘a well-functioning internal market in
consumer credit’.1 As part of its goal to establish a well-functioning market, the
European legislature granted protection to consumers who wished to ‘discharge
fully or partially their obligations arising from (a) credit agreement before the
due date’.2 In other words, the Directive granted the consumer the right to
repay loans fully or partially at any time. It additionally provided that
consumers are ‘entitled to a reduction in the total cost of the credit, such
reduction consisting of the interest and the costs for the remaining duration of
the contract’.3 The total cost of the credit, as defined in Art 3(g) of the Directive,
includes ‘interest, commissions, taxes and any other kind of fees which the
consumer is required to pay in connection with the credit agreement’.4 The total
cost of credit also includes any fees for ancillary services if ‘the conclusion of
(that) service contract is compulsory in order to obtain the credit or to obtain it
on the terms and conditions marketed’.5
In the well-known Lexitor case,6 the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) interpreted these provisions to mean that consumers have the
right to receive a pro-rated reimbursement of both the fixed, up-front costs and
the recurring costs7 of a loan in the event of early repayment. The decision was
met with criticism and reluctance to comply by credit institutions.8
The Advocate General in his opinion, and the CJEU in its judgment,
asserted that the choice made by the European lawmaker to reimburse both upfront costs and recurring costs was a pragmatic choice rather than an ideal one.9
1 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008, on credit
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2008] OJ L 133/66.
2 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 16(1).
3 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 16(1).
4 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 3(g).
5 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 3(g).
6 Case C-383/18, Lexitor v Santander Consumer Bank S.A., Judgment of 11 September 2019,
available at www.eur-lex.europa.eu.
7 Recurring costs are the costs incurred by the lender while the loan is in progress. In other
words, they are the costs that ‘depend objectively on the duration of the contract’. Case C-383/18 n 6
above, para 24.
8 See, eg, Intesa Sanpaolo, ‘Information on risks and relative hedging policies’, available at
https://tinyurl.com/t262ujx6 (last visited 30 June 2021) (stating that it believed the Italian banking
law Article 125-sexies could not be interpreted in a manner that complies with the Lexitor ruling
and that while it would comply, it ‘reserves the right to reconsider this operational stance in light of
future developments’); Prawo, ‘Polish banks are disregarding the Court of Justice of the European
Union judgment regarding loans; Civil Rights Ombusman set to intervene’, available at
https://tinyurl.com/54nvvyzs (last visited 30 June 2021) (discussing that some Polish banks ‘are
proving loath to refund all the costs incurred by them’ despite the CJEU’s decision).
9 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, paras 33-34, 55, 63-65, 68. In para 53 of his Opinion, the
Advocate General stated that the rule establishing that up-front costs are not reimbursable while
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First, there was the practical problem of distinguishing between up-front and
recurring costs.10 Second, there was a risk that if it established that up-front
costs were non-reimbursable but recurring costs were reimbursable, credit
institutions could use their discretion in invoicing costs to increase up-front
costs to artificially lower the amount of reimbursable costs.11 In other words, the
credit institution could categorize a recurring cost as an up-front cost and charge
the consumer when setting up the loan to avoid any potential reimbursement in
case of early repayment. Because of these issues, the Advocate General and the
CJEU concluded that the European legislator chose a rule that is easier to apply,
under which all the up-front and recurring costs of the credit, as defined by the
European Directive, are reimbursable on a pro-rated basis.12 But as discussed in
this article, allowing for the reimbursement of the up-front costs of a loan can
create several inefficiencies, hurting both the consumer and the market for
credit. While these inefficiencies exist because of the pragmatic choice of the
legislature, the inefficiencies of this rule can be limited by making n0nmandatory ancillary services — those voluntarily purchased by the consumer —
ineligible for reimbursement. This conclusion is supported both by the intent of
the legislature as well as by considering the economic incentives.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section II, we discuss
the economic incentives created by the EU rules regarding early repayment of
loans, providing special focus on whether granting consumers the right to early
repayment is economically efficient and whether mandating partial
reimbursement of up-front costs, as interpreted by the CJEU, is economically
efficient. In Section III, we consider the question of whether consumers should be
entitled to receive a reimbursement of the cost of third-party services that were
not required for obtaining the credit, ie, non-mandatory ancillary services, such
as the cost of financial advice and intermediation or additional insurance. We
analyze both the intent of the European legislature in drafting Directive
2008/48/EC as well as examine the economic incentives under such a rule. In
Section IV, we provide concluding thoughts on whether Directive 2008/48/EC
and the Lexitor judgment should be interpreted to allow partial reimbursement
costs dependent on the duration of the loan are reimbursable may ‘appear (…) at first sight to be
relatively simple and therefore interesting, (but) its practical application will probably give rise to
considerable difficulties of a practical nature. Indeed, as highlighted by the referring court in its
request, credit institutions rarely specify which of the costs they incur are covered by the costs
charged to consumers and, even when this occurs, the consumer would be entitled to dispute the
accuracy of such specification’. The Advocate General added that maintaining the distinction
between up-front costs and costs dependent on the duration of the loan may be impractical because
‘in the event of a dispute over the amount of the reduction to which the consumer is entitled in the
event of early repayment, national courts (would) have to call on the services of accounting experts,
even if, by their nature, the costs in question are relatively modest’. Op. A.G., Case C-383/18,
Lexitor, paras 53, 55.
10 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, paras 33, 53, 55.
11 ibid paras 31, 54.
12 ibid paras 37, 66, 68.
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of voluntarily purchased services in the event of early repayment. In sum, we
conclude that the European legislature did not intend for non-mandatory ancillary
services to be partially reimbursable in the event of early repayment, and the
economic incentives support this conclusion.
II. The Law and Economics of Early Loan Repayments
The European Directive 2008/48/EC gave consumers the right to repay a
loan early and to receive a pro-rated reimbursement of the ‘total cost of the
credit’. The Lexitor judgment interpreted this to conclude that in the event of
early repayment of a loan, the lending credit institution must provide a pro-rated
reimbursement of both recurring and up-front costs to the consumer. But allowing
for the reimbursement of up-front costs creates several inefficiencies in the
market for credit. While this choice may not be the ideal choice, as described by
the Advocate General and the CJEU, it was the pragmatic choice.
1. The Pragmatic Choice of the European Legislature in Enacting
Directive 2008/48/EC
Under Directive 2008/48/EC, in an aim to provide flexibility and protection to
consumers, the European legislature granted consumers a right to early repayment
of loans when the consumer is no longer interested in continuing a credit
relationship. From an economic point of view, this may be considered efficient by
allowing the capital to be put to more desirable uses. But if such a clause were truly
efficient, then one would expect it to be included in every loan contract. Yet the
legislature granted this right to overcome persistent information asymmetries in
the market for lending. Additionally, the CJEU, in the Lexitor judgment,
concluded that Directive 2008/48/EC granted consumers the right to partial
reimbursement of both recurring and up-front costs of credit in the event of
early repayment. While allowing for partial reimbursement of up-front costs
can alter consumer decisions leading to market inefficiencies, the European
legislature made the pragmatic choice and granted these rights to consumers to
overcome information asymmetries.
a) Granting Consumers the Right to Repay Loans Early
In Directive 2008/48/EU the European legislature granted consumers the
right to repay loans early. The legislature sought to lay down rules for a world
where there are consumers who obtain long-term loans but who, due to events
that were unforeseen ex ante, no longer need to keep the loans until their
natural maturity. In an ideal world with perfect information, both the consumer
and the credit institution would be able to accurately determine in advance the
optimal duration of the credit relationship. Then the need for an early repayment
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provision, as mandated under Directive 2008/48/EC, would not be necessary in a
contract. However, because it is often unfeasible to know ex ante the ideal duration
of the credit relationship, European legislators sought to protect consumers
entering into contracts with imperfect information.13
Imagining a world with these consumers, the European legislator sought to
protect consumers by granting them the inalienable right to make early repayment
of loans, allowing them to discharge fully or partially their obligations under the
credit agreement at any time.14 This mandatory rule may be considered efficient
as it means that when a loan is repaid in advance by a consumer who no longer
needs it, the money can be put to more economically productive uses. But if it
were truly efficient, then one would expect this clause to be included in every
lending contract.
In a transaction between a rational, perfectly informed consumer and an
equally rational, perfectly informed lender, all the contractual terms will be
efficient. Thus, a rule allowing the consumer to make early repayment would be
instinctively included in the parties’ contract, without being imposed as a binding
requirement by the legal system. However, the need for a mandatory rule
allowing early repayment of loans, as included in Art 16(1) of the Directive,
arises from the fact that the consumer may not be perfectly informed. If the
consumer is imperfectly informed, the lender could include an inefficient clause
in the contract, unbeknown to the consumer, prohibiting the consumer from
paying back the loan early. The appearance of inefficient clauses in consumer
contracts, permitted by consumers’ imperfect information, is commonplace. Thus,
the legislature’s choice to grant consumers the right to early repayment can be said
to be efficient under such conditions, helping to protect consumers from
information asymmetries.
b) Directive 2008/48/EC Interpreted to Allow for the Partial
Reimbursement of Up-Front Costs of Loans
However, in the Lexitor judgment, the CJEU concluded that under Directive
2008/48/EC consumers also have the right to a partial reimbursement of upfront costs in the event of early repayment of loans. If granting consumers the right
to early loan repayment, as laid down by Directive 2008/48/EC, can be regarded
as efficient in a world where consumers take out loans without knowing whether
unforeseeable events will counteract the advantage of keeping the loan until its
natural maturity, it is worth verifying whether the interpretive rule laid down by
the Lexitor judgment on the reimbursability of up-front costs is also efficient in
a consumer world such as the one described above, specifically when there is an
information asymmetry.15
13 Information is imperfect when it is not complete, ie, full.

14 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 16(1).
15

A situation of ‘asymmetric information’ arises when one party to a potential agreement has
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It has to be said that the reimbursability of up-front costs produces an
expected benefit for the consumer. In the event of early repayment of the loan, the
consumer receives a sum of money that would not otherwise have been returned.
However, this rule also imposes an expected cost on the lender who, when
determining the fee for the service of providing the loan, must take into account
all the costs that will be incurred, including the expected costs of fee
reimbursement.16 The consumer will then have to weigh his potential benefit
against the fee increase to obtain the loan that will certainly be imposed by
lenders under the Lexitor rule that up-front costs are partially reimbursable.
If the increase in fee imposed by lenders to provide a loan is higher than the
value that the consumer attributes to an early repayment clause, the legislature
can be said to have overprotected and ultimately damaged consumers. This
would give rise to a heterogony of ends.17 Suppose we have a lender who by
definition is assumed to be risk neutral and a risk-averse consumer who decide
to enter into a € 10,000 loan contract for ten years. Also assume that the loan
origination costs are € 1,000. The lender incurs these costs, but immediately
passes them on to the consumer. If the parties were able to freely negotiate the
clauses concerning early repayment of the loan, the question is whether they
would include a clause allowing for the pro-rated reimbursement of the upfront costs incurred to set up the loan. The up-front costs are sunk costs,
meaning that they are incurred for the purpose of setting up that specific loan
and have no potential use outside that relationship.
Imagine that the parties initially agreed on pro-rated reimbursement in the
event of early repayment of the loan. Suppose that, given the expectation of
reimbursement, there is a fifty per cent probability that the consumer will
discharge the loan after five years and a fifty per cent probability that he will
keep the loan until its natural maturity. In this case the lender faces a risk equal
to ½ (–500) and ½ (0), with an expected monetary value equal to –€250. As
the lender is risk neutral, the certainty equivalent of this risk is –€250.18 Hence,
greater knowledge than the other party.
16 Early repayment rules also seek to protect the credit institution, as it could enter into a credit
relationship on the basis of asymmetric information in favor of the consumer. The information
asymmetry arises from the fact that the credit institution does not know which consumers wish to
have a sum of money at their disposal for a short period of time, repaying the loan early, and which
for a long period of time. A consumer interested in having a sum of money at his disposal for a short
period of time may prefer a long-term loan, with the intention of repaying it early, rather than
obtaining a short term-loan. Because of the partial reimbursement of up-front costs, the long-term
loan may ultimately be less expensive to the consumer but imposes an additional cost on the lender.
The lender will raise the cost to obtain a loan to offset this potential loss.
17 Heterogony of ends is the idea that seeking a certain end goal can cause experiences that
modify the original motivation seeking out that goal. In other words, ‘the end does not always
produce the means, but the means oftener originate the end’. G. Villa, Contemporary Psychology
(New York: MacMillan Co, 1903), 366-369.
18 The certainty equivalent in this context is the value required to leave the lender indifferent
between the consumer paying the loan after five years and the consumer paying the loan after its
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the lender will request a fee increase of €250 from the consumer. For his part,
the consumer faces an expected risk of ½ (500) and ½ (0), with an expected
monetary value equal to €250. As the consumer is risk-averse, for him the
certainty equivalent of this risk is lower than €250.19 For the consumer, the
right to obtain partial reimbursement of the up-front costs of the loan would be
inefficient, as the consumer would be forced to pay more for the loan than the
consumer would benefit due to the lender’s risk that the consumer pays back the
loan early. In this case, the consumer would not acquire the loan and the credit
market would shrink. Thus, imposing the right to repay loans early and the rule of
partial reimbursement, as under the Lexitor judgment, while seeking to benefit
consumers, could actually end up harming consumers. But because of information
asymmetries and possible evasive action by the credit institution, as detailed by the
Advocate General and the CJEU, the Lexitor rule is the pragmatic choice.
While granting consumers the right to repay loans early and allowing for
the partial reimbursement of up-front costs could end up harming consumers
and thus be inefficient, so far it has been implicitly assumed that the rule that
only recurring costs must be reimbursed is the ‘ideal’, or efficient, rule.
However, only allowing for the reimbursement of recurring costs would give
rise to evasive behavior by credit institutions. Thus, the legislature, as affirmed
in the Lexitor judgment, made the pragmatic choice and granted consumers the
right to partial reimbursement of both recurring costs and up-front costs to
overcome information asymmetries in the market.
The European Court of Justice in its Lexitor judgment reminds that in
practice a rule only allowing for the partial reimbursement of recurring costs (to
the exclusion of the up-front costs) gives rise to evasive behavior, whereby
lenders do not return the recurring costs in the event of early repayment of the
loan because they artificially increase the up-front cost items and likewise
artificially decrease the recurring cost items.20
Up-front costs are those costs that the lender incurs in processing the loan
and preparing the contract. They cease to apply when the contract is finalized.
In the language of the Lexitor judgment, up-front costs are those that ‘do not
depend objectively on the duration of the contract’.21 Up-front costs are usually
incurred by the lender but are then reimbursed by the consumer when the loan
contract is concluded.22 In contrast, recurring costs are defined as costs incurred by
the lender while the loan is in progress, for example, management costs. In other
natural maturity, in this case €250.
19 In other words, because the consumer is risk-averse, he is not indifferent to paying €250 to
the lender to allow him to either pay the loan after five years or pay the loan after its natural
maturity. The consumer would be indifferent only if he pays the lender less than that amount.
20 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, para 31.
21 ibid para 24.
22 One form of reimbursement of the up-front costs may be paid by deducting these costs from
the borrowed sum.
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words, they are costs that ‘depend objectively on the duration of the contract’.23 As
a rule, these costs are incurred periodically throughout the life of the loan at a
constant amount.24
To establish whether allowing for the partial reimbursement of up-front costs
would give rise to evasive behavior, it is first necessary to verify whether the result
described by the European Court of Justice would actually happen in a
competitive market and then to verify whether such a result would give rise to
inefficiencies.25
Suppose that a ten-year loan contract entails up-front costs of €500 and
recurring costs of €500. Following the reasoning developed by the European
Court of Justice and taking it to its extreme, we can assume that lenders will
charge up-front costs equal to €1,000 and recurring costs equal to zero.
Imagine that there are two competitor companies that do not collude, and
that have adopted the same strategy. As in the previous example, suppose there
is a ½ probability that the consumer will repay the loan early after five years.
So, the provision that the recurring costs are equal to zero (in other words
that the recurring costs will not be reimbursed) will result in an expected benefit
for the lender equal to €250. The same provision, however, will result in an
expected loss for the consumer, as he will take a ½ risk of losing €500, when he
repays early. The choice facing the consumer therefore has an expected
monetary value equal to ½ (0) and ½ (–500), ie, – €250. However, it has been
assumed that the consumer is risk averse (since he is unable to diversify the risk
across a portfolio of loans); therefore, the expected loss will be higher than –
23 Case C-383/18 n 6 above, para 24.

Recurring costs are usually prepaid to the lender by the consumer by means of deduction
from the borrowed sum.
25 It could be argued that the European legislature was not concerned by the effect that
establishing the reimbursability of the up-front costs might have, and namely that consumers
interested in obtaining a short-term loan would request a long-term loan with the intention of
repaying it early and therefore obtaining reimbursement of the up-front costs. The judges in the
Court of Justice of the European Union point out that the European legislature’s choice was
pragmatic and not ideal, due to the various difficulties that would arise if a distinction was made
between up-front and recurring costs. But if the European legislature’s choice was pragmatic, this
means that if it were not for the practical problems in distinguishing between up-front and
recurring costs, its ideal choice would have been a different one. And that ideal choice would have
been to make only the recurring costs reimbursable. This appears to be the most convincing
reconstruction of the European legislature’s intent. One might then ask why the ideal choice would
be to make up-front costs non-reimbursable. And the answer inevitably lies in the need to prevent
consumers interested in short-term loans from actually taking out long-term loans with the
intention of repaying them early and obtaining reimbursement of the up-front costs. This conduct is
harmful to credit institutions and indirectly to consumers who take out long-term loans with the
intention of maintaining them until their due date, as the cost of the early reimbursements will be
passed on through the installments these consumers are required to pay. Furthermore, the
reimbursability of up-front costs gives rise to considerable inefficiencies, as will be seen in this
article. So, if the European legislature’s ideal choice would have been to make up-front costs nonreimbursable, it is necessary to go back to it when there are valid reasons, as this would discourage
the taking out of long-term loans with the intention of repaying them early.
24
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€250. Assume, for the sake of this example, it is – €400.
Where we have two competing lenders and perfectly informed consumers,
the contractual provision setting up-front costs equal to €1,000 and recurring
costs to zero will not survive. In fact, one of the two competitors could offer the
consumer the correct breakdown of up-fronts costs equal to €500 and
recurring costs equal to €500. With this contractual provision, the recurring
costs will have to be partially reimbursed in the event of early repayment of the
loan and therefore there will be an expected cost for the lender equal to – €250.
The consumer on the other hand will obtain an expected benefit equal to
€400.26 If the lender were to offer the consumer an amendment of the contract
in these terms in exchange for a fee increase equal to €300, for example, both
parties would gain.27 Therefore, a clause that would artificially qualify all the
costs to be up-front, such that nothing would need to be reimbursed in the
event of early repayment, would not be sustainable in a competitive market.
However, the efficient clause will only emerge if consumers are perfectly
informed. In this specific case they would have to read the contracts accompanying
the loan and understand their clauses. But acquiring knowledge of contracts
involves a cost, and this cost may exceed the expected benefit. In this case,
consumers will forgo reading and understanding the contract. There will be a
form of rational apathy. In the presence of this consumer apathy, it will no
longer be worthwhile for lenders to distinguish between up-front and recurring
costs, but only to describe all costs as up-front costs. In that way, lenders will
not have to reimburse any cost in case of early repayment of the loan, even if
some costs are in fact depending on the duration of the contract.
Hence adverse selection will occur and the inefficient clause describing all
the costs as up-fronts costs will prevail over the efficient clause making a
truthful distinction between up-front costs and recurring costs. The inefficiency
will lie in the fact that the clause describing all the costs as up-fronts costs will
result in a benefit for the lender of €250 and a cost for the consumer of €400,
with a loss of social welfare equal to €150 per contract.
In interpreting Directive 2008/48/EC, the CJEU concluded the European
legislature opted for the pragmatic rather than ideal choice because of the
practical difficulty in distinguishing between up-front and recurring costs. It
may have also opted for this choice to avoid the risk that banks would artificially
inflate up-front costs and reduce recurring costs in the presentation of their
financial proposals to reduce their exposure to early repayment costs. However,
this does not alter the fact that in the absence of these difficulties, the rule
26 Because of the consumer’s risk aversion, the benefit of receiving the loan with up-front and
recurring costs separately, allowing for the potential of partial reimbursement, is greater than if the
consumer were risk neutral.
27 While the consumer must pay more for the loan, because of his risk aversion, he is willing to
pay more to have the potential for reimbursement. In this example, the lender will benefit by € 50
and the consumer will benefit by €100.
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affording greater protection to consumers and credit institutions should provide
for proportional reimbursement of the recurring costs only, while keeping the upfront costs required for creating the debt intact. There would be no reason to set
aside the ideal rule where the aforementioned pragmatic reasons no longer
applied, but because of the information asymmetries, the legislature chose exactly
that, opting for the pragmatic choice.
Because of information asymmetries, the European legislature established
that consumers have the right to repay loans early and, as decided in Lexitor,
the right to partial reimbursement of both up-front and recurring costs. While
granting these rights helped overcome the information asymmetries present in
lending, it creates several inefficiencies, changing the way consumers act in the
credit market.
2. The Inefficiency of the Reimbursability of Up-Front Costs and
Origination Fees
While Directive 2008/48/EC overcame information asymmetries in the
right to repay loans early and obtain reimbursements of the costs of a loan, in
allowing for the reimbursement of both recurring and up-front costs, the
Lexitor judgment creates several inefficiencies in the market for credit. First,
consumers may, instead of obtaining short-term credit, seek out long-term credit
with the explicit intention to repay the loan early due to its lower final cost. Second,
because of the lower final cost to obtain long-term credit, there may be an
overconsumption of credit by consumers who value the loans at lower than their
societal cost. While the Directive sought to provide protection to consumers, these
inefficiencies may ultimately hurt them.
a) Consumers Fail to Internalize the Costs of a Loan Under Partial
Reimbursement of Up-Front Costs
The Lexitor judgment granted consumers the right to a partial reimbursement
of both recurring and up-front costs in the event of early repayment. But
allowing the partial reimbursement of up-front costs in the event of early
repayment of a loan means that a person entering into a long-term loan
contract with the precise intention to repay it in the short term, and therefore
recover the up-front costs, does not internalize (ie incorporate) all of the costs
required to provide the specific service of granting the loan. As the costs of
providing the service are not fully internalized, a person may well purchase this
service even when the private benefit is lower than the social cost. This creates a
negative externality, which the consumer fails to take into account, giving rise to
an inefficiency.
In deciding whether to purchase a loan, a borrower will compare his own
private benefit to his private cost, represented by the sum that will not be
recovered when repaying the loan early. If the private benefit is higher than the
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private cost, the borrower will purchase the loan. But in some instances, the
private benefit is lower than the social cost, ie, the sum of the private cost that
the borrower incurs and the private cost that the lender incurs (represented by
the cost to be reimbursed). In such instances, when the private benefit is lower
than the social cost, the rule providing partial reimbursement of up-front costs,
as decided by the Lexitor judgment, produces an inefficiency.
To help determine how consumers would behave in a world where upfronts costs must be partially reimbursed in the event of early repayment of
loans, we can first examine the opposite scenario — a situation where there is
no requirement to partially reimburse up-front costs in the event of early
repayment. This world accurately reflects many European legal systems prior to
the Lexitor judgment.28
Suppose that consumers can be divided into those seeking a short-term
loan (one year) and those seeking a long-term loan (ten years). Suppose also
that the up-front costs for a short-term loan are slightly lower than for a long28 This includes the Italian legal system. For example, Art 125-sexies of the TUB (the Italian
Banking Law) provides that consumers are entitled to a reduction in the total cost of the credit in
the event of early repayment. Decreto Legislativo 1 September 1993, no 385, Art 125-sexies (It). But
prior to the Lexitor judgment, this provision was consistently interpreted as meaning that up-front
costs did not have to be partially reimbursed. This was the opinion expressed by both independent
authorities and ordinary courts. After the Lexitor judgment, Italian law scholars have considered
the issue whether that decision influences the interpretation of Italian law. Some scholars claimed
that Art 125-sexies of the TUB should now be interpreted in the sense that all the costs must be
reimbursed, both up-front and recurring. These scholars maintain that, since the formulation of the
EU Directive and Italian law are quite identical, it’s not possible to interpret Italian law in a way that
is different from the interpretation given by CJEU to Art 16, of Directive 2008/48/EC. That opinion
can be found in A. Dolmetta, ‘Anticipata estinzione e “riduzione del costo totale del credito.” Il caso
della cessione del quinto’ Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, II, 639 (2019). The same idea is expressed
by A. Tina, ‘Il diritto del consumatore alla riduzione del costo totale del credito in caso di rimborso
anticipato del finanziamento ex art. 125-sexies, primo comma, t.u.b. prime riflessioni a margine della
sentenza della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione europea’ Rivista di Diritto Bancario, 155, 166 (2019).
A different idea is formulated by A. Zoppini, ‘Gli effetti della sentenza Lexitor nell’ordinamento
italiano’ Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, 1, 11 (2020), who states that, since the Italian regulatory
system and the role of independent authority (Banca d’Italia) prevent lenders from manipulating
upfront costs, Italian law should be interpreted so that only recurring costs must be reimbursed.
An important decision has been issued by Arbitro Bancario Finanziario, Collegio di
Coordinamento, 17 December 2019 no 26525. It states that all costs must be reimbursed because
the Italian law can be interpreted only in this way. Indeed, every Italian judge has a duty to interpret
Italian law in a way that it results in a meaning that conforms to European law (obbligo di
interpretazione conforme), and the formulation of Art 125-sexies of the TUB permits this interpretation.
At this moment the Supreme Court has not given a solution to the problem. Some judges have
stated that Art 125-sexies of TUB can be interpreted in a way the is compatible with the Lexitor
judgment while others have stated that it’s not possible.
In the former sense, see Tribunale di Napoli 29 June 2020 no 4433, available at www.dejure.it;
Tribunale di Torino 22 September 2020, available at www.dejure.it and Tribunale di Milano 3
November 2020, available at www.dejure.it.
In the latter sense, see Tribunale di Napoli 10 March 2020 no 2391, available at www.dejure.it;
Tribunale di Mantova 30 June 2020, available at www.dejure.it and Tribunale di Roma 11 February
2021, available at www.dejure.it.
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term loan. Let us assume that for a short-term loan the up-front costs are equal
to €4,000, while for a long-term loan they are equal to €5,000. In the world
that is being considered, that is, where the rule enshrined in the Lexitor
judgment does not exist and up-front costs are not reimbursed, consumers
seeking short-term financing will take out loans with a short-term maturity
(one year), incurring up-front costs of €4,000. In contrast, consumers seeking
long-term financing will take out loans with a ten-year duration, incurring upfront costs of €5,000. Both categories of consumers will internalize all of the
up-front costs to determine which type of loan to take out, as no form of
recovery is envisaged. This results in consumers self-separating.
But consumers will behave in a considerably different manner if it is
established that up-front costs must be partially reimbursed in the event of early
repayment of loans, as under the Lexitor rule. Suppose that the pro rata temporis
principle29 is applied to calculate the sum to be reimbursed for up-front costs. This
means that a consumer who enters into a ten-year loan contract, initially paying
€5,000 for the up-front costs incurred by the intermediary, will obtain a
reimbursement of €4,500 if he repays the loan after one year.30 In other words, the
final cost of the loan would be equal to €500. Thus, operating under a rule
imposing partial reimbursement of up-front costs means that all consumers
seeking one year financing who, in the absence of this Lexitor reimbursement
rule, would have taken out one-year loans, will instead find it advantageous to
take out ten-year loans with the precise intention to repay them after one year,
recovering a large portion of the up-front costs and significantly reducing their
private costs of obtaining a loan. When taking out a long-term loan with the
intention to repay it early reduces the cost of the loan for the consumer, every
consumer would adopt this strategy, even though this would create higher
overall costs of loan creation for the bank.31
The ability for consumers seeking one-year financing to take out a ten-year
loan with the precise intention to repay it after one year arises from the information
asymmetry between consumers and lenders. Indeed, when faced with a consumer
requesting a ten-year loan, lenders have no way of knowing whether the consumer
is someone who intends to repay the loan in advance or is someone who intends to
29 The pro rata temporis principle means that the consumer is reimbursed at the proportional
rate for the amount of time that the consumer keeps the loan for. For example, if the consumer
repays a ten-year loan after one year, he is entitled to a reimbursement of nine-tenths of the costs.
30 Since it is otherwise a ten-year loan and the consumer pays the loan back after one year, the
consumer is entitled to a reimbursement of nine-tenths of the up-front costs of the loan, or €4,500.
31 This switch between seeking short-term credit and long-term credit with the explicit
intention to repay it in the short term is termed the ‘switching effect’. The ‘switching effect’ will only
occur if the up-front costs for ten-year loans are not much higher than those of one-year loans. For
example, if the up-front costs for one-year loans are equal to €1000 while those for ten-year loans
are equal to €12,000, this switching effect would not occur, as the cost to repay a ten-year loan early
would cost €200 more than a one-year loan. Accordingly, consumers seeking one-year financing
would enter into loan contracts with one-year maturity.
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keep it until its natural maturity. If lenders could identify consumers intending to
repay the loan after one year, they would refuse to enter into a long-term loan
with them or would only offer them a loan with a one-year maturity.32
However, given current legislative restrictions, there is no way for lenders to
discern one type of consumer from another.
Thus, under the Lexitor rule, consumers may be incentivized to purchase
long-term credit with the explicit intention to repay the loan early, despite only
seeking short-term credit in the absence of such a rule. And because credit
institutions cannot distinguish between consumers, they will need to increase
the costs for consumers to obtain credit to compensate for the potential
reimbursement of the up-front costs of loans. This creates an inefficiency in the
market.
b) Partial Reimbursement of Up-Front Costs May Lead to OverConsumption of Long-Term Credit
Until now the focus has been on the behavior of consumers who seek a oneyear loan, but instead, under the Lexitor rule, take out a ten-year loan with the
undisclosed intention to repay the loan at an earlier time, given the
reimbursability of the fixed origination costs. However, requiring the partial
reimbursement of the up-front costs can lead to an overconsumption of credit.
The rule can incentivize consumers who otherwise would not obtain a loan
(low-valuing consumers) to enter the market and purchase credit despite
valuing it less than its social cost, creating a second inefficiency.
By creating a discrepancy between the private cost faced by the consumer
and the actual total cost of loan origination faced by the bank, ie, the social cost,
the Lexitor rule can encourage consumers who might not otherwise seek a loan
to obtain one, leading to an overconsumption of lending. For example, let us
again assume the up-front costs for a one-year loan equal €4,000. Consumers
who choose a long-term loan instead of a short-term loan will accordingly value
the loan to be at least €4,000.33
The introduction of the Lexitor rule allowing for the partial reimbursement
of up-front costs will lead some consumers who value the loan less than €4,000
and might not otherwise take out a one-year loan, to purchase one. In a market
without the rule of partial reimbursability, given the lower benefits obtained in
the short term of a one-year loan, consumers would not justify incurring the
high up-front costs. But under the Lexitor rule, because part of the high up32 Due to asymmetric information, the credit institution cannot know whether the consumer is

interested in having a sum of money at his disposal for a short period of time, an interest achieved
by taking out a long-term loan with the intention of repaying it early and recovering the up-front
costs, or whether the consumer is really interested in a long-term loan. If there was no asymmetric
information, the credit institution would refuse the loan to the consumer intending to make early
repayment, thus obliging him to take out a short-term loan.
33 This assumes the long-term loan has higher up-front costs than the short-term loan.
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front costs are reimbursable, consumers may justify taking out long-term loans
with the intention to repay them early, lowering the private cost of obtaining a
loan.34 This solution will be adopted by consumers for whom the private benefit
obtained from a loan is higher than the private cost they incur. In the example
considered, this cost is equal to €500 (consumers pay €5,000 in up-front costs
but recover €4,500). As a result, any consumer who obtains a benefit of more
than €500 from a loan will request a long-term loan with the intention to repay
it after one year. Accordingly, any new borrowers who value the one-year loan
at between €500 and €4000 will enter into the market for long-term loans. But
obtaining such a long-term loan imposes a social cost. This social cost is equal
to the up-front costs of €5,000, which outweighs the private benefit of between
€500 and €4,000. Here, a very clear inefficiency can be observed.
It must therefore be said that the introduction of the rule as enshrined in
the Lexitor judgment into a world where the reimbursement of up-front costs is
not required will create two negative consequences. First, consumers who
would have otherwise taken out a one-year loan will now take out a ten-year
loan with the intention to repay the loan early. Second, the rule will now
incentivize consumers who would never have obtained a loan prior to this rule
to enter the market because the private benefit will exceed the private costs after
reimbursement, despite the high social cost. In other words, allowing for the partial
reimbursement of up-front costs in addition to recurring costs, as under the
Lexitor rule, will lower the costs to obtain a loan, leading to an overconsumption of
credit by low-valuing consumers. Hence, a rule such as the one enshrined in the
Lexitor judgment may produce at least these two inefficiencies in the credit market.
However, while the Lexitor judgment may create these inefficiencies, the
European legislature and the CJEU chose this rule because it was the pragmatic
choice. While these inefficiencies may arise as part of consumer behavior,
legislatures can choose to mitigate these inefficiencies by limiting what up-front
costs are eligible for reimbursement. As described in the next section, by
choosing to exclude from reimbursement the up-front costs for non-mandatory
ancillary services, the legislatures can mitigate adverse consumer incentives in
the credit market.
III. Reimbursability of Other Non-Mandatory Ancillary Services
As discussed in the previous sections, a rule imposing the mandatory
partial reimbursement of up-front costs in addition to recurring costs can lead
to several inefficiencies. Because consumers do not internalize the full costs
when partially reimbursed in the event of early repayment, they may enter into
long-term loans when only seeking short-term lending, or consumers may
34 Again, this assumes that a long-term loan has higher up-front costs than a short-term loan.
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obtain loans they might otherwise purchase, imposing a social cost on others.
However, as detailed by the Advocate General and the CJEU, the European
legislators chose the pragmatic option in allowing for reimbursement of the upfront costs.35 One natural extension to the reimbursement of up-front costs is
whether the European legislators also sought to allow for the reimbursement of
up-front, non-mandatory third-party services, that is, those services voluntarily
purchased by consumers in obtaining the loan. As detailed in this section, both
the legislative intent and economic considerations lead to the conclusion that
non-mandatory ancillary services should not be eligible for reimbursement in
the event of early loan repayment. Excluding voluntarily incurred costs from
eligibility for reimbursement in the event of early repayment helps to mitigate
the inefficiencies in the credit market that arise under the Lexitor judgment.
There might be some concern that this view cannot take into account the
possibility that the formal ‘non-compulsory’ nature of additional costs may
often times be a mere façade, over which the consumer has no control. Indeed,
lenders could bundle these services. But it’s worth noting that, according to Art
3 of the Directive 2008/48/EC, an ancillary service is ‘non-compulsory’ only if
the conclusion of a service contract is not necessary in order to obtain the credit
or ‘to obtain it on the terms and conditions marketed’.
1. Directive 2008/48/EC Excludes the Reimbursement of NonMandatory Services Offered by Third Parties in the Event of
Early Repayment
The European legislature, in Directive 2008/48/EC, provided consumers
with the right to repay a loan early and to receive a partial reimbursement of
both the up-front and recurring costs of the loan. But there is an open question
of whether the legislature intended this to include up-front costs of nonmandatory ancillary services, that is, services voluntarily purchased along with
the loan, eg, insurance services. These costs should not be eligible for partial
reimbursement in the event of early loan repayment. Excluding such costs from
reimbursement carries out the intent of the legislature and mitigates the
economic inefficiencies detailed previously, which would otherwise be present
in the credit market.
Directive 2008/48/EC, as discussed earlier, states in part that consumers
shall be entitled to a reduction in the total cost of the credit, such
reduction consisting of the interest and the costs for the remaining
duration of the contract.36
The total cost of the credit, as outlined in Art 3 g) includes
35 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, paras 33-34, 53, 55, 63-65, 68.

36 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 16(1).
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interest, commissions, taxes and any other kind of fees’ for ancillary
services if ‘the conclusion of (that) service contract is compulsory in order
to obtain the credit or to obtain it on the terms and conditions marketed.37
A literal interpretation of the Directive 2008/48/EC suggests that, if the
definition of reimbursable up-front costs includes the services that the credit
institution prescribes as mandatory to obtain the credit, then it accordingly does
not include the costs of other ancillary services offered by third parties that the
credit institution does not prescribe as mandatory. According to the operative
part of CJEU’s judgment in Lexitor,
Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/48/EC ... must be interpreted as
meaning that the right of the consumer to a reduction in the total cost of
the credit in the event of early repayment of the credit includes all the costs
imposed on the consumer.38
An inattentive reading of the decision could lead to the view that the EU
Court did not wish to introduce any distinction between costs, meaning that even
the costs of non-mandatory services should be proportionally reimbursed along
with all other up-front costs. However, the operative part of the judgment must
be interpreted carefully and in light of the statement of reasons for the ruling.
Firstly, the operative part makes a clear reference to the costs ‘imposed’ on
the consumer (ie, the costs for the services that the bank requires the consumer to
purchase to obtain the credit), but not to those that the consumer bears voluntarily
(ie, non-mandatory ancillary services purchased from third parties).39 In
describing which costs are reimbursable, the explicit usage of the ‘total cost of the
credit’ in para 23 of the CJEU judgment makes express reference to Art 3(g) of the
Directive, under which the costs borne by consumers are proportionally
reimbursable ‘if ... the conclusion of a service contract is compulsory in order to
obtain the credit or to obtain it on the terms and conditions marketed’.40 In
light of Art 3 g) of the Directive, the operative part of the Lexitor judgment must
therefore be read as meaning that the cost of non-mandatory ancillary services
must be excluded from the definition of ‘total cost of the credit’ because they are not
compulsory to obtain credit. Therefore, they must not be eligible for
reimbursement in the event of early repayment.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that, as expressly ruled by the CJEU, the
Court’s interpretation of the term ‘total cost of the credit’ was established by
taking into account the fact that the consumer protection system, set up by the
Directive, ‘is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis
37 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 3 g).
38 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, para 36 (emphasis added).
39 ibid para 36.

40 ibid para 5 (emphasis added).
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the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of
knowledge’.41 If we consider the objective pursued by the European legislature,
namely that of protecting the consumer with regards to the ancillary services
imposed by the credit institution, then the costs that the consumer decides
independently to incur must not be reimbursed in the event of early repayment.
Thus, interpreting the operative part of the Lexitor judgment in the light of
its statement of reasons, the consumer’s entitlement to the reimbursement of
the proportional cost of the credit in the event of early repayment of the credit
includes all of the costs that the consumer must incur, but excludes those for
ancillary services purchased by the consumer voluntarily, ie, those services not
imposed on him by the credit institution to obtain the credit or to obtain it on
the terms and conditions marketed.
Non-mandatory ancillary services include, with greater reason, those
purchased independently by consumers and offered by third parties rather than
directly by the credit institution.42 For example, these services include the cost of
financial advice, intermediation, and additional insurance that are not required by
the credit institution, but the consumer chooses to purchase. According to the
aforesaid legislation and statement of reasons in the Lexitor judgment, the cost of
non-mandatory services must be excluded from the costs eligible for
reimbursement by the credit institution in the event of early repayment of the
loan.
While the operative part of the Lexitor judgment, interpreted in light of its
statement of reasons, leads to the conclusion that non-mandatory ancillary
services are not reimbursable in the event of early credit repayment, this
interpretation also falls in line with the pragmatic considerations made by the
Advocate General and upheld by the CJEU. One objection raised by the Advocate
General noted that in the event of a dispute, the distinction between up-front costs
and costs dependent on the duration of the loan, ie, recurring costs, would require
national courts to call on the services of accounting experts.43 However, the need to
obtain outside experts is not necessary for understanding the costs of nonmandatory services offered by third parties. Because these services are, in fact,
services that are not offered by the credit institution itself, but by other entities,
the costs are fully independent of those of the credit institution, and therefore
are easily distinguishable ex post.44 Therefore, allowing for the reimbursement
Case C-383/18, n 6 above, para 29 (citing C-377/14, Radlinger and Radlingerová,
EU:C:2016:283, para 63).
42 The services offered by third parties cannot be inflated or manipulated to the advantage of
the credit institution, the conclusion of a service contract is compulsory in order to obtain the credit
or to obtain it on the terms and conditions marketed and forcing the lenders to reimburse the cost
of those services would impose an even greater externality on borrowers who do not exercise early
repayment.
43 Case C-383/18, n 6 above, para 54.
44 Because the consumer will receive a defined price when choosing to purchase a nonmandatory ancillary service from third parties, an estimation of the cost is not needed when
41
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of these types of costs was not within the scope of the Advocate General’s or
CJEU’s intent.
Similarly, the Advocate General’s and CJEU’s concern that credit institutions
could use their discretion in invoicing costs to increase up-front costs to the
detriment of recurring costs,45 when applied to non-mandatory ancillary
services, is not applicable for two obvious reasons. First, because the lending
intermediary has no direct control over the prices of services offered by third
parties, it does not benefit from any increase in the price of these services aimed
at creating a nominal reduction in the reimbursable costs linked to the duration
of the loan. Second, unlike the mandatory services governed by Directive
2008/48/EC, if the price of the non-mandatory services offered by third parties
were artificially increased, the consumer demand to purchase such services
would fall, resulting in the opposite effect to the one intended by the credit
institution.46 Accordingly, these costs were outside the consideration of the
legislature and should not be eligible for partial reimbursement.
Interpreting the Lexitor judgment in light of its pragmatic considerations,
the European legislature did not intent for the partial reimbursement of nonmandatory ancillary services in the event of early loan repayment as these
incurred costs are voluntary. The European legislature only sought to allow for
the partial reimbursement of compulsory costs. This conclusion is further
supported by economic considerations. As detailed in the next section, even if it
appears that the European legislature’s decision was designed to protect credit
institutions—by making the cost of non-mandatory services non-reimbursable
in the event of early withdrawal—the decision is a legislative choice that, above
all, protects consumer welfare and fosters economic efficiency. After all, as stated in
Recital 7 of the Directive, the aim of the European legislation was to ‘facilitate
the emergence of a well-functioning internal market in consumer credit’.47
2. Economic Inefficiency of the Reimbursement of Up-Front
Costs for Non-Mandatory Services Offered by Third Parties
The exclusion of up-front costs that are voluntarily purchased by consumers
from eligibility for partial reimbursement in the event of early repayment also
determining any reimbursement of costs. Accordingly, these services fall outside the scope of the
Advocate General’s concern, ie, non-mandatory ancillary services are not meant to be included in
any potential reimbursement of costs.
45 See above Section II, 1, a).
46 The credit institution, if it sought to maximize profits, would actually achieve the opposite
effect to the one intended. Supposing that the credit institution arranges with the third party to
artificially increase the fee for ancillary services offered by the third party, at the same time reducing
the nominal amount of the recurring costs borne by the credit institution, this could lead to a
decrease in the purchase of the ancillary services offered by the third party, leaving the credit
institution unable to recover the recurring costs.
47 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, pmbl 7.
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follows from economic considerations. The Advocate General and the CJEU,
both in their statement of reasons, detailed that the European legislature chose
the pragmatic rule rather than the ideal rule. If non-mandatory ancillary service
costs were reimbursable, it would create several negative externalities. First,
allowing for the reimbursement of voluntarily incurred costs would impose higher
costs onto other consumers. Second, because the costs of providing loans may rise,
the long-term credit market could shrink. Finally, if, in response to the allowing
partial reimbursement of non-mandatory up-front costs credit institutions chose to
not enter into contracts with consumers purchasing such services, the market for
third party services would become inefficient.
a) Inefficiency Caused by Early Paying Consumers Passing Costs
onto Other Consumers
The conclusion that under Directive 2008/48/EC, the costs for nonmandatory ancillary services purchased from third parties should not be
reimbursed follows from a specific logic of efficiency. Specifically, it helps mitigate
the inefficiencies in consumer behavior when overconsuming long-term loans as
described in Section 2. The efficiency of this rule can be illustrated by the following
example. For the sake of simplicity, imagine the case of a twenty-year credit
relationship with a total value of €1,000, repayable in twenty installments of €50.
Suppose that the cost of the non-mandatory ancillary services offered by third
parties is equal to €100. Consider a credit institution with a pool of consumers,
thirty percent of whom intend to exercise the right of early withdrawal after
payment of the first installment. Also, suppose that the ancillary service has a
full value for consumers who intend to maintain the credit until its natural
expiry, and it has a reduced value, lower than the price of the service itself, for
consumers who intend to make an early repayment. Consider the two alternative
rules.
Rule 1. Non-reimbursability of the costs relating to non-mandatory services
offered by third parties.
Under this first rule, any non-mandatory ancillary service offered by third
parties will only be purchased by consumers who are interested in it and who
value it more than the requested price. The cost of the credit relationship
remains equal for all consumers, €1,000, with installments of €50. Furthermore,
presuming the service only has a special value for consumers who intend to
maintain the loan until its natural expiry, for example, an additional insurance
service, consumers will make different choices. Those who intend to maintain the
loan for its full duration will purchase the ancillary service, while those who intend
to repay it early will not purchase the service. Since early paying consumers know
they will not receive a partial reimbursement if repaying the loan early, there will be
no benefit to purchasing the ancillary service but not fully utilizing it over the
duration of the loan. Hence, there will be no inefficiencies. Only those who
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actually value the service at its consumer price will purchase the service.
Rule 2. Reimbursability of the costs relating to non-mandatory services
offered by third parties.
In contrast, under this second rule, the pool of consumers will not make
different choices, leading to inefficiencies. Consumers who intend to exercise
the right of early repayment will purchase the non-mandatory ancillary service,
regardless of the value they attach to it, expecting that the price paid for the
service will be proportionally reimbursed upon repayment. The non-mandatory
service offered by third parties would therefore be purchased by consumers who
value it less than its original cost in addition to the purchasers under Rule 1.
So, for example, suppose that the non-mandatory service consists of
mediation. The cost of mediation is €100. Even though the benefit is of little value
to a consumer who intends to pay off the twenty-year loan after the first
installment, he will still purchase it, trusting that the cost of the mediation will be
reimbursed upon early repayment. Hence, there will be inefficiencies.
The decision to make the up-front cost of non-mandatory services
reimbursable, which at first appears to be an extension of legislation to protect
consumers, would instead harm consumers who use the credit facility for its
original duration. Because all consumers will purchase the non-mandatory
service offered by third parties, the consumer cost of a loan will rise. Indeed, the
credit institution will have to consider the proportional reimbursement of
services purchased by consumers when those consumers exercise the right of
early repayment. Imagine a pool of 100 customers with 30 customers exercising
the right of early repayment. In the example considered above, the installments
would increase from €50 to €51.99 for all contracting parties.48 Those who
exercise the right of early repayment, receiving proportional reimbursement of
the optional services they purchased, would impose an unwanted cost (ie, a
negative externality) on those who instead remain bound by the credit
relationship for its entire duration.
In social terms, there will also be a waste of resources because consumers
will use the third-party, non-mandatory service even though they value the service
less than its cost.49 The costs of most of the non-mandatory services, even if not
reimbursed to the consumer, cannot be reversed or recovered from a social point of
view. Because these costs are incurred up-front, overconsumption of the service
In calculating the reimbursement made to consumers who made early repayment, the pro
rata temporis principle was applied, under which the credit intermediary reimbursed €95 to each
one. In a pool of one hundred customers, the sum reimbursed to the thirty customers who made
early repayments is equal to €2,850. When the cost of these reimbursements is passed on ex ante to
all 1430 remaining installments, each installment increases by €1.99.
49 Consumers who value the service less than the cost will purchase the service if they plan to
repay the loan early if they value the benefit of the service more than the amount of costs not
reimbursed upon early repayment (essentially, if the lowered ‘cost’ of the service is below the
consumer’s benefit). As discussed previously under Rule 1, if the consumer would not receive partial
reimbursement, they would not purchase the service at the full ‘cost’ because the benefit is lower.
48
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can lead to costs on others. By overconsuming, those consumers who value the
service less than its cost can keep other, higher-valuing consumers from obtaining
the service. In other words, low-valuing consumers impose a social cost, leading to
inefficiencies in the credit market.
As discussed, when a consumer who intends to make early repayment
purchases a non-mandatory service, the cost of the service passes on to all
consumers through an increase in the consideration. In the scenario discussed
previously, this cost is equal to €100. If the value assigned to the non-mandatory
ancillary service is lower than €100, the consumer’s overall welfare will decrease.
So, if a consumer intending to make early repayment assigns the non-mandatory
ancillary service a value of €10, on account of it being passed on to consumers
through an increase in the cost of €100, the welfare (in other words their
wealth) of the other consumers who maintain the loans for the full term will
decrease by €90. In aggregate terms, allowing for the reimbursability of the
costs of third-party, non-mandatory ancillary services will normally reduce the
consumers’ welfare. Paradoxically, in terms of distribution, the rule will benefit
consumers who repay the loan early, providing them a partial reimbursement,
by passing on the cost of the reimbursement to those who remain bound by the
original terms of the credit agreement. This creates an inefficient market for
third-party services.
In sum, if partial reimbursements of the up-front costs of non-mandatory
services purchased from third parties were allowed, it would create an
inefficient market. Consumers who repay the loan would impose an unwanted
cost on those who retain a loan for its natural duration in the form of higher
installment costs. It would also impose a social cost by reducing overall social
welfare, as consumers would purchase the service even though they value it less
than its cost. Thus, to avoid this inefficiency, and as supported by the intent of
the European legislature, partial reimbursements of up-front costs of nonmandatory ancillary services should not be permitted. This aligns the incentives
of consumers and also mitigates the inefficiencies described in Section 2 that
arise by imposing the requirement of partial reimbursement of at least some
up-front costs when repaying a loan early.
b) Long-Term Credit Market Could Shrink Under Market
Inefficiencies
Second, allowing for the partial reimbursement of the costs of non-mandatory
ancillary services in more extreme cases could raise the problem previously
addressed by the economists Joseph Stiglitz in his work published with Andrew
Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’,50 resulting in
50 J.E. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information’ 71
American Economic Review, 393-410 (1981).
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a contraction of the long-term credit market. By excluding the costs of these
services from possible reimbursement in the event of early repayment, consumers’
incentives to purchase a long-term loan when seeking short-term lending will
be reduced.
Consider the example used above of a credit intermediary with a pool of
customers who have taken out long-term loans. The intermediary has set the
requested installment, bearing in mind that a percentage of the customers will
pay the debt off early, requiring reimbursement of the service costs. The
intermediary will set a higher installment cost to offset the costs created by
customers who opt for early repayment. However, this higher installment cost
will mostly be borne by consumers who intend to maintain the long-term loan
agreement. It will only have a marginal impact on consumers who intend to pay
the loan off in the short term.51 The increased installment cost will therefore
discourage a higher portion of consumers from requesting the loan who intend to
maintain the long-term loan agreement until its natural expiry. The withdrawal of
these consumers from the pool of consumers will cause the percentage of
customers intending to make early repayment to increase. In response, the credit
intermediary will have to deal with a higher percentage of early repayments than
anticipated and will have to set an even higher installment price for subsequent
agreements. This new installment price will compel even more potential
customers intending to maintain the long-term credit until its natural expiry
not to request the loan. In this way, the long-term consumer credit market will
gradually shrink. In essence, long-term consumers would be penalized by
externalities created by consumers who pay loans off early, creating a
problematic imbalance in the capital market. This would create an inefficient
market by shrinking the availability of long-term credit, all driven by consumers
obtaining long-term credit to satisfy short-term credit needs.
But, if as proposed here, the costs of non-mandatory ancillary services are
excluded from possible reimbursement in the event of early repayment, the
inefficiency of reimbursing up-front costs as required under the Lexitor
judgment can be mitigated. Only those consumers who value a given service at
or above its social cost will purchase it. Accordingly, any increase in installment
cost necessary to offset the possible reimbursement of costs to customers who
opt to repay the loan early will be minimized.
As seen by this discussion, allowing for partial reimbursement of the costs
of non-mandatory ancillary services can create several inefficiencies. It can
harm those consumers who intend to keep long-term loans until their natural
expiry by increasing the costs of obtaining a loan. It could also lead to the
market for long-term loans to shrink, again hurting consumers. To avoid these
51 Because the price of every installment for all consumers will increase, those who pay off the
loan early only pay a fraction of the overall increase in cost, while those who pay off the loan over all
the original installments face the full increase in cost.
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negative externalities, and as intended by the European legislature, the partial
reimbursement of non-mandatory services purchased from third parties in the
event of early repayment should not be permitted.
c) Lender’s Refusal to Enter into the Contract Can Create an
Inefficient Market for Third Party Services
Despite the preceding discussion, there is the possibility that these supposed
inefficiencies could disappear as the result of evasive action on the part of
lenders. Under a rule allowing for the partial reimbursement of non-mandatory
ancillary services, lenders may well refuse to enter into loan contracts with
consumers who have purchased these services because they may have to partially
reimburse the costs in the event of early repayment of the loan. As a consequence,
consumers would be incentivized to no longer purchase that specific ancillary
service (consider, for example, ancillary services such as insurance policies).
However, this evasive action would not eliminate all the inefficiencies caused by the
Lexitor rule.
In fact, if on the one hand the ancillary service would no longer be
purchased by consumers who value it less than its cost – which would increase
efficiency – on the other hand, it would also result in those consumers who
value it more than its cost to decide not to purchase it. In this case an
inefficiency would remain. So, even if the ancillary service were to disappear
from the market because lenders refuse to enter into loans with persons who
purchased this service, an inefficiency would still exist as consumers who value
the ancillary service more than its cost would forgo the service.
Accordingly, if the Lexitor judgment were to allow for partial reimbursement
of costs of non-mandatory services offered by third parties, the lenders, by
refusing to contract with consumers who purchase third-party services, would
create an efficiency. If, on the other hand, as is described earlier, the Lexitor
judgment excludes partial reimbursement of costs of these services, then this
inefficiency will not be present, as consumers will only purchase the service if
they realize the full benefit, and lenders will not refuse to enter loan contracts
due to fear of having to repay part of the costs.
Thus, the inefficiencies of allowing for the partial reimbursement of nonmandatory services offered by third parties under the Lexitor judgment show
that such an interpretation is economically undesirable. This supports the
legislature’s intent as described by the pragmatic considerations discussed by
the Advocate General and the CJEU. By granting the right to early repayment
and a pro-rated reimbursement in the event of early repayment of both up-front
and recurring costs under Directive 2008/48/EC and the Lexitor judgment, the
legislature overcomes the information asymmetries present in the lending
market. But as discussed in this section, that can lead to its own inefficiencies.
To mitigate these inefficiencies, the partial reimbursement of voluntarily purchased
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services from third parties under the Lexitor judgment should not be permitted.
IV. Concluding Thoughts on the Interpretation of Directive
2008/48/EC
The legal and economic points made above lead to a convergent conclusion
on how best to the interpret European Directive 2008/48/CE, considering the
fact that the European legislature sought to foster the ‘emergence of a wellfunctioning internal market in consumer credit’.52 With regard to the economic
treatment of consumers who wish to ‘discharge fully or partially their
obligations arising from the credit agreement before the due date’, the favored
interpretation must follow the provisions set forth in Art 3 g) of the Directive.53
More specifically, a consumer exercising the right of early repayment will be
entitled to a pro-rated reimbursement of the costs that the intermediary prescribes
as mandatory to obtain the credit from the credit institution. However, this right
must not extend to the cost of ancillary services supplied by third parties that are
not required by the credit institution, such as, the cost for financial advice and
mediation or for non-mandatory additional insurance.
The inclusion of the costs of non-mandatory ancillary services supplied by
third parties among those eligible for reimbursement in the event of early
repayment would lead to misuse of the long-term credit facility. It would also
lead to the excessive purchase of non-mandatory ancillary services by those
intending to exercise the right to make early repayment provided for by
European legislation, as described previously.
The long-term credit facility would be misused as consumers wishing to
have short-term availability of a sum of money will find it advantageous to enter
into long-term loan agreements, envisaging early repayment. This would allow
them to proportionally recover all the costs, including the up-front costs (in the
scenario examined, the costs for services purchased voluntarily from third
parties), making long-term loans cheaper than short-term loans.
The excessive use of non-mandatory ancillary services, coupled with the
rule of early repayment with reimbursement, would lead to the creation of
negative externalities by those using the credit in the short term to the
detriment of those using the credit for its natural duration, in other words, the
long term. Whenever an activity creates negative externalities, it will be pursued
more than the socially optimal level. Indeed, it will even be implemented when
the private benefit is lower than the social cost. Hence, there will be excessive
purchasing of non-mandatory ancillary services offered by third parties. To avoid
European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, pmbl 7. Even
the Lexitor judgment reminds, in para 4, that the Directive seeks to create the ‘emergence of a wellfunctioning internal market in consumer credit’. Case C-383/18, n 6 above, para 4.
53 European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2008/48/EC, n 1 above, Art 3 g).
52
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this and adhere to the European legislature’s intent, the partial reimbursement of
non-mandatory ancillary services should not be permitted under the Lexitor
judgment.
V. Conclusion
Upon examining the incentives under the Lexitor rule, we can say that the
introduction of a rule under which up-front costs must be partially reimbursed
in the event of early repayment of loans will produce inefficiencies compared to
the ideal world where only recurring costs must be returned. But the existence
of this ideal world necessitates the impossibility of evasive behavior on the part of
lenders. If evasive behavior can be implemented because consumers are not
informed, then the state of the world that emerges with the rule of reimbursement
of only recurring costs will be affected by inefficiencies. These inefficiencies will
arise from the fact that the prevailing market clause will effectively establish that
not even recurring costs must be returned.
So, it is a matter of choosing the second-best solution. The Lexitor judgment
opted for the rule that even up-front costs must be reimbursed. The inefficiencies
produced by this rule could be limited by making the up-front costs items that
cannot be artificially increased by lenders non-reimbursable. In other words, nonmandatory ancillary services, those voluntarily purchased by the consumer, should
not be eligible for partial reimbursement in the event of early repayment. This
conclusion follows from both the intent of the legislature as well as the economic
considerations, namely the inefficiencies that arise if reimbursement of the costs of
these services were mandatory.

